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FEDERAL ASBESTOS LEGISLATION: 
WRESTLING WITH THE MEDICAL ISSUES 
Patrick M. Hanlon*
INTRODUCTION 
Asbestos litigation began in earnest in the 1970s, and the 
first proposals to substitute a federal compensation scheme for 
the tort “system” came almost at the same time.1 These 
proposals and the many that followed in the succeeding decades, 
came to nothing. The failure of legislative reform was not due to 
the grand success of the tort system. On the contrary, as early 
as 1991, the U.S. Judicial Conference’s Ad Hoc Committee on 
Asbestos Litigation found that the situation with respect to 
asbestos litigation “has reached critical dimensions and is getting 
 ∗ Patrick M. Hanlon is a partner in the Washington Office of Goodwin 
Procter LLP, where he concentrates on litigation and government affairs. He 
represent the National Association of Manufacturers, which has been one of 
the main participants in the debate over comprehensive asbestos reform, and 
he was a participant in many of the events discussed here. The views 
expressed in this paper are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of his 
firm or his clients. A version of this paper was presented at the Brooklyn 
Law School Science for Judges Program on November 4, 2006. 
1 The first hearings on asbestos litigation occurred in the 1970s, and 
from the late 1970s through 1985 asbestos legislation was a perennial item on 
the Congressional calendar. Congress then fell silent on the issue. The U.S. 
Judicial Conference’s Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation strongly 
recommended legislation in 1991, but that recommendation lead only to 
hearings⎯no bill was introduced. Serious efforts at asbestos legislation did 
not begin until after the Supreme Court’s decision in Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). See Patrick M. Hanlon & Anne M. Smetak, 
Asbestos Changes, 62 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. LAW 525, 557-564 (2007) 
[hereinafter “Asbestos Changes”]. 
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worse.”2 According to the Ad Hoc Committee: 
Dockets in both federal and state courts continue to 
grow; long delays are routine; trials are too long; the 
same issues are litigated over and over; transaction 
costs exceed the victims’ recovery by nearly two to 
one; exhaustion of assets threatens and distorts the 
process; and future claimants may lose altogether.3
The Ad Hoc Committee’s call for legislation fell on deaf ears. 
The future foretold by the Ad Hoc Committee came to pass. 
Shortly after the Supreme Court’s decision in Amchem, Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), put an end to hopes of creating 
an administrative claims mechanism through a broad class action 
settlement, asbestos litigation exploded.4 New claims were being 
filed at a rate approaching 100,000 per year.5 Many of these 
claims were concentrated in courts new to the litigation, such as 
Holmes County, Mississippi, which saw unprecedented verdicts 
for people who had physical indications of asbestos exposure but 
2 REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON 
ASBESTOS LITIGATION 2 (1991). 
3 Id. at 3. 
4 The Supreme Court in Amchem noted almost plaintively that, while the 
“argument is sensibly made that a nationwide administrative claims 
processing regime would provide the most secure, fair, and efficient means of 
compensating victims of asbestos exposure,” Congress “has not adopted such 
a solution.” Amchem, Inc. v. Windsor, 421 U.S. 591, 628-29 (1997). This 
was the first of several occasions in which the Supreme Court rejected the 
invitation to create special asbestos law to control the burgeoning mass of 
asbestos cases and called upon Congress to adopt a comprehensive reform. 
See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999) (“Like 
Amchem . . . this case is a class action prompted by the elephantine mass of 
asbestos cases, and our discussion in Amchem will suffice tos how how this 
litigation defies customary judicial administration and calls for national 
legislation.”) (internal citations omitted); Norfolk & Western Ry Co. v. 
Ayers, 548 U.S. 135, 166 (2003). For a comprehensive account of the 
aftermath of the Amchem decision, see Asbestos Changes, supra note 1, at 
548-56. 
5 STEVEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION 71, Tbl. 4.1 
(RAND Institute for Civil Justice 2005) [hereinafter “RAND REPORT”]. 
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no current breathing impairment—the so-called “unimpaired.”6 
Increasingly, asbestos claims were solicited all over the country 
and then channeled to plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions through 
sophisticated networks of plaintiffs’ lawyers.7 The sudden 
escalation in asbestos litigation led to a wave of bankruptcies 
beginning in 2000.8 By the end of 2002, the vast majority of 
major asbestos defendants had filed for protection under the 
bankruptcy laws.9 The total number of asbestos bankruptcies 
exceeded 70, and more than two-thirds of these were filed after 
January 1, 2000.10 The absence of traditional defendants 
accelerated pressures to bring new ones into the litigation, and 
the RAND Corporation estimated that by the end of 2002 the 
litigation had involved 8,400 companies throughout the 
American economy.11
This deteriorating situation transformed Congressional 
attitudes toward asbestos litigation. By early 2003, there was a 
bipartisan consensus that the asbestos litigation system was 
6 In one such case, a Mississippi jury awarded $150 million in 
compensatory (not punitive damages) to 6 men who plainly had no current 
impairment. See R. Parloff, $200 Billion Miscarriage of Justice, FORTUNE 
166 (May 4, 2002). 
7 Asbestos Changes, supra note 1, at 552-53. 
8 Id. at 555-56. 
9 The magnitude of the early 21st century asbestos bankruptcies can be 
illustrated by looking at the list of defendants in the seminal 1970s case 
against the asbestos industry, Borel v. Paper Prods. Fibreboard Corp, 493 
F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973). Almost all of those defendants had gone bankrupt 
by 2002. (Fibreboard Paper Products Co & Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp. 
(2001), Johns Manville (1982), Pittsburgh Corning (2000), Philip Carey 
Corp. (part of Celotex bankruptcy, 1990), Armstong Cork Corp. (Armstrong 
World Industries 2001, ACandS 2002), Ruberoid Div. of GAF (G-I 
Holdings, 2002), Standard Mfg and Insulating Co. (1986), Unarco Industries 
Inc. (1982); Eagle-Picher Industries Inc. (1991); Combustion Engineering 
(2003)). While many companies that eventually became important defendants 
were not parties to Borel, the mortality rate of those that were parties 
indicates the economic impact of asbestos litigation on the affected 
companies. 
10 RAND REPORT, supra note 5, at 69, 152-53. (Table D.1, collecting 
asbestos bankruptcies through 2004) 
11 Id. at 79. 
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broken and needed fixing. There was, as yet, no consensus on 
what to do. 
The primary forum was the Senate. Because Senate rules 
allow a minority with 41 votes to prevent consideration of 
legislation, that body was considered the more difficult hurdle.12 
The House had little interest in taking up the asbestos issue if 
any legislation approved by the House would be blocked in the 
Senate. The Senate considered two approaches. The “medical 
criteria approach” would have made a limited number of 
changes to address the most significant abuses of the tort 
system.13 The heart of this concept was the adoption of medical 
criteria that would have prevented the “unimpaired” from 
pursuing claims and would have tolled the statute of limitations 
to ensure that asbestos victims could still sue when they became 
sick.14 Medical criteria legislation was advocated by many 
defendants and insurers, a portion of the asbestos plaintiffs’ bar 
that specialized in representing cancer claimants, and the 
American Bar Association.15 It was opposed by the AFL-CIO, 
12 Standing Rule XXII(2) provides for the closing of debate on matters 
other than amendment of Senate rules if “three fifths of the Senators duly 
chosen and sworn” vote for a so-called “cloture motion.” Normally three-
fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn are 60—which means that 41 
votes are enough to block cloture. Historically, the failure to shut off debate 
meant that senators would stay up all night reading the phone book in a 
classic filibuster. Today’s Senate is less colorful and more efficient. When it 
becomes clear that a matter cannot proceed, the majority leader will generally 
withdraw it rather than waste scarce legislative time in useless debate. During 
the 107th, 108th, and 109th Congresses (2001-2006) the Senate was always 
closely balanced between Republicans and Democrats and was for a brief 
period controlled by Democrats. Asbestos reform was perceived as primarily 
a Republican initiative. The Senate could not adopt an asbestos bill of any 
kind unless it appealed to enough Democrats (and commanded the support of 
enough Republicans) to overcome a filibuster. 
13 S. 413 (108th Cong. 2003), introduced by then Sen. Don Nickles (R-
AZ), was the main vehicle in the Senate incorporating the “medical criteria” 
approach. 
14 Id. at §§ 4.6. 
15 A legislative proposal involving the “medical criteria” approach was 
negotiated in 2001 among representatives of the American Insurance 
Association, the “Asbestos Alliance” led by the National Association of 
HANLON.DOC 7/11/2007 6:24 PM 
 FEDERAL ASBESTOS LEGISLATION 1175 
                                                          
most asbestos (and other) trial lawyers, and some large 
defendants and insurers who advocated a more radical change. 16
The second approach involved developing a federal 
administrative compensation scheme that would for practical 
purposes substitute for the tort system. That approach—clearly 
what the Supreme Court had in mind in calling for national 
legislation—was proposed by the “Asbestos Study Group” or 
“ASG” and had the support of insurers with large asbestos 
liabilities.17 Since the trust fund idea was in principle congenial 
to the AFL-CIO, it had the potential to attract support from 
some Democrats. However, another key Democratic 
Manufacturers, and plaintiffs’ lawyers representing cancer victims, led by 
Steven Kazan of Oakland. Kazan presented the case for this approach before 
the Senate Judiciary Committee in September 2002.Asbestos Litigation: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 188-89 (2002) 
(Statement of Steven Kazan).The ABA’s House of Delegates adopted a 
resolution supporting federal legislation establishing medical criteria at its 
mid-year meeting in February 2003. Resolution Adopted by the House of 
Delegates of the American Bar Association (Feb. 2003) (on file with author). 
See also Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Hearing before the Senate Comm. On the 
Judiciary 21, 108th Cong. 61 (2003) (testimony & written submission of 
Dennis Archer, President-Elect of the American Bar Ass’n);. 
16 See Asbestos Changes, supra note 1, at 562-64; Patrick M. Hanlon & 
Anne M. Smetak, Asbestos Reform in the States, Materials Presented in ALI-
ABA Conference on Asbestos Litigation in the 21st Century 1-18 (Nov. 30-
Dec. 1, 2006) (discussing the “reform analysis” underlying medical criteria 
and other proposed tort system changes as implemented in the states). 
17 The “Asbestos Study Group” or “ASG” led the business interests 
seeking an administrative compensation system. The ASG included such 
companies as General Electric, Pfizer, Dow, Honeywell, Halliburton (prior 
to 2004), General Motors, and Ford. Several insurance companies who were 
major players in asbestos litigation also supported proposals for an 
administrative system, although as the panic of 2002 abated, some early 
supporters of the trust fund concept dropped away and (in the case of Liberty 
Mutual) even came to lead the opposition. See, for example, S 3274: The 
Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2006, Hearing before the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, June 7 2006 (Statement of Edmund F. 
Kelly, Chairman and CEO of Liberty Mutual Group) available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1931 (last checked May 31, 
2007); 152 Cong. Rec. S753 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 2006) (Liberty Mutual 
member of coalition paying about $3 million to defeat the FAIR Act).. 
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constituency, the trial lawyers were united in their opposition to 
an administrative compensation program. 
In March 2003, Senator Orrin Hatch, then chairman of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, chose to press for an administrative 
compensation scheme which was eventually dubbed the “FAIR 
Act.”18 The Hatch bill was approved by the Senate Judiciary 
Committee in July 2003 with amendments that were nearly 
fatal.19 The bill was nursed back to life through an extraordinary 
mediation effort by Judge Edward R. Becker of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.20 Judge Becker 
volunteered his time at the request of Senator Arlen Specter (R-
PA), who subsequently became Chair of the Judiciary 
Committee in 2005. Between 2003 and 2006, Judge Becker 
presided over more than 50 meetings among stakeholders, 
brokering compromises on many issues, and recommending fair 
solutions of many others to Senator Specter.21 The bill that 
18 FAIR stands for “Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution.” There have 
been several versions of the FAIR Act: S. 1125 (2003), S. 2290 (2004), S. 
852 (2005) and S. 3274 (2006). S. 852 was the version eventually brought to 
the Senate floor in February 2006, and S. 3274 was introduced 3 months 
later with changes designed to address some of the objections to S. 852. 
Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2006, S. 3274, 109th Cong., 
2006. For convenience, this paper generally refers to S. 3274 unless 
otherwise indicated. 
19 See Sen. Rep. 108-18 (July 21, 2003). The most important issues are 
discussed in Patrick M. Hanlon, Commentary: The FAIR Act: A Freeze 
Frame, Mealey’s Asbestos Bankruptcy Report v. 3, no. 1, 37, 46-48 (August 
2003). 
20 152 Cong. Rec. S5398 (daily ed. May 30, 2006) (resolution 
recognizing accomplishments of Judge Edward R. Becker). 
21 Id. In August 2003 the author attended the first meeting over which 
Judge Becker presided. That meeting was followed by scores of meetings and 
conference calls. It was an extraordinary experience. At one moment the 
group would be buried in detail, and then it would be debating broad 
questions of policy, with Judge Becker all the while encouraging, cajoling, 
brokering, listening, arbitrating, leading. If the stakeholders did not succeed 
in reaching consensus, the failure was not Judge Becker’s. The disagreements 
were too deep, and the stakes too large. During all this time Judge Becker 
was fighting his own losing battle with cancer. He died in May 2006, to the 
deep sorrow of those who knew him. 
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ultimately went to the floor in 2006 was a bipartisan bill, 
sponsored both by Chairman Specter and Ranking Member 
Patrick Leahy (D-VT), and much different from the bill 
introduced by Senator Hatch in 2003.22
The FAIR Act reached the floor of the Senate on February 
6, 2006.23 On February 14 (St. Valentine’s Day), it was 
defeated by one vote on a motion to waive a point of order that 
required 60 votes.24 Senator Daniel Inouye (D-HI) was absent 
for personal reasons and would have voted in favor of the bill 
had he been present.25 The bill had bipartisan support: 15 
Democrats joined 44 Republicans in voting to waive the point of 
order.26 Those numbers show, however, that the bill had strong 
bipartisan opposition as well. The key to the bill’s defeat was 
strong opposition by a group of at least 11 conservative 
Republican senators who might normally have been expected to 
vote for tort reform legislation.27 While these senators had a 
number of concerns, the most important was a fear that the 
administrative compensation program would eventually cost far 
22 Compare S. 852 (109th Cong.) with S. 1125 (107th Cong.). 
23 152 CONG. REC. daily ed. S697 (February 6, 2006) . 
24  Id. at S1168-69. 
25 The margin of defeat may have been somewhat larger than one vote. 
Several Republican Senators who voted to waive the point of order are 
rumored to have done so because they were unwilling to challenge the Senate 
leadership and thought that the bill would fail anyway. Some of those 
senators might have changed their votes if the outcome had been riding on 
them. 
26 Id at S. 1168. This count includes in the Democratic column of 
supporters Senator Jeffords, an Independent who caucused with the 
Democrats. After the decisive vote the Majority Leader, Senator Bill Frist 
(R-TN) changed his vote on waiving the point of order from “yea” to “nay” 
for reasons of parliamentary procedure. (This allowed him to move to 
reconsider the vote later). The vote tally in the text includes Senator Frist as 
among the bill’s supporters; in fact he was one of the bill’s principal 
champions. 
27 Id. The Republicans who voted to uphold the point of order killing the 
bill were Senators Bunning (KY), Crapo (ID), Demint (S.C.), Ensign (NV), 
Graham (SC), Gregg (NH), Inhofe (OK), McCain (AZ), McConnell (KY), 
Sununu (NH), and Thune (SD). As noted above, Senator Frist voted against 
waving the point of order only after the motion had already failed. 
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more than its advocates expected (or, some thought, admitted) 
and would become a federal financial responsibility.28 The 
nightmare of these senators was the possibility that the FAIR 
Act would evolve in the same manner as the federal Black Lung 
program.29 As we shall see, the “Black Lung Issue” ultimately 
killed the bill because it was impossible to arrive at an 
agreement on scientific issues regarding the appropriateness and 
effect of the bill’s eligibility criteria. 
This Article examines the attempts of the bill’s sponsors and 
critics to address (or, in some cases, get around) these scientific 
issues. Those attempts were exceedingly difficult for two 
reasons. First, there were strong disagreements within the 
scientific community on medical issues, and each side of the 
political debate distrusted judgments of experts associated with 
the other side—in part because of the entanglement of so many 
experts in the litigation. Second, it was hard to assess the effect 
of any particular eligibility criteria in a brand new administrative 
context. For example, eligibility standards that worked well 
28 These concerns were most clearly expressed by Douglas Holtz-Eakin, 
fomer director of the Congressional Budget Office, in a hearing on S. 3274, 
which was introduced in May 2006 in an effort to overcome the problems 
that had blocked S. 852 in S. 3274: The Fairness in Asbestos Injury 
Compensation Act of 2006 (S. 3275), Hearing before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary (June 7, 2006) (Statement of Douglas Holtz-Eakin), available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1931. 
29 The leading study on the Black Lung Act is PETER S. BARTH, THE 
TRAGEDY OF BLACK LUNG: FEDERAL COMPENSATION FOR OCCUPATIONAL 
DISEASE (1987). Barth points out that congressional supporters of the Black 
Lung program consistently underestimated the costs of the program, id. at 
283, and the coal excise taxes that were designed to shift program costs to 
the industry never were sufficient to offset the costs of legacy (pre-enactment) 
claims. Id. at 48-49, 190-92; see also Edward Rappaport, The Black Lung 
Benefits Program, CRS Report for Congress 4-6 (June 12, 2002). While the 
program has generally performed much more soundly since reforms in the 
early 1980s, the Federal Treasury has continued to be burdened with 
substantial costs. See, e.g., U.S. General Accounting Office, Black Lung 
Program: Further Improvements Can Be Made in Claims Adjudication 7-8, 
GAO/HRD 90-75 (1990). As a result of its early runaway costs, Black Lung 
has come to symbolize the fiscal dangers that may be created by federal 
injury compensation programs. BARTH, supra, at 284. 
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enough in the context of tort settlements would not necessarily 
work the same way in a no-fault administrative compensation 
program with radically lower transaction costs.30
In Part I, I will show why developing politically acceptable 
medical and exposure criteria despite profound distrust of the 
medical experts was a central challenge for the framers of 
asbestos compensation legislation. After explaining the basic 
structure of the FAIR Act in Part II, I will turn in part III to an 
analysis of the various strategies used to resolve, or avoid 
having to resolve, the important medical questions and the 
difficulties that each of those strategies entailed. As we shall 
see, despite considerable political creativity, at the end of the 
day the effort to resolve or evade the medical issues generated 
problems that eroded confidence in the bill and contributed to its 
demise.  
I.  WHY IS THIS SO HARD? 
The FAIR Act was an effort to substitute a compensation 
system based on cause for one based on fault.31 Compensation 
would be based not on the responsibility of any particular 
defendant but on whether the claimant had an asbestos-related 
disease. Conceptually, if not in the details of its operation, the 
FAIR Act resembled workers’ compensation, where the question 
of fault is replaced by work-relatedness. The problem, however, 
was that the amount of compensation provided by the FAIR Act 
was much higher than is usual in cause-based programs. 
Politically, therefore, the FAIR Act would only be acceptable to 
defendants and insurers (and their supporters in the Congress) if 
the overall cost were controlled by (1) reductions in transaction 
costs (especially the fees of plaintiff and defense attorneys), (2) 
30 These and other problems encountered by the FAIR Act in its tortured 
history are discussed in greater detail in Patrick M. Hanlon, Elegy for the 
FAIR Act, 12 CONN. INS. L. J. 518 (2006) [hereinafter “Elegy”]. 
31 For this distinction see Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, 
Private Insurance, Social insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision 
of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 78-79 
(1993). 
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elimination of substantial compensation for tens of thousands of 
people who had some physical manifestation of asbestos 
exposure but were otherwise quite well, and (3) eligibility 
criteria that would preclude unexpectedly high claiming rates. 
In a perfect world, the adequacy of the bill’s eligibility 
criteria would be a question of medicine. One would look to 
independent and impartial doctors to draw the necessary lines (as 
was done in the case of cancers other than mesothelioma and 
lung cancer). In this imperfect world, however, that was easier 
said than done. Over a 25-year period, in which $70 billion had 
already changed hands, it was very difficult to find doctors 
generally regarded as “independent” and “impartial.” Most 
prominent experts in asbestos medicine had long since taken 
sides, and many depended on the litigation for a substantial part 
of their income. Moreover, the FAIR Act could only work if the 
eligibility criteria were kept simple and objective, and it is the 
almost universal tendency of doctors (not to mention lawyers) to 
want to make informed judgments based upon a consideration of 
all the relevant factors. A judgment-based system, however, 
would not only have high transaction costs, but would make 
everything depend on which physicians were making the 
judgments (which all too often was thought of as a question of 
which side’s physicians were making the judgments). 
Thus, the fate of the FAIR Act necessarily depended on how 
well it could solve the problem of developing politically 
acceptable medical criteria despite profound distrust of the (other 
side’s) medical experts. As discussed below, the Senate used 
every means at its disposal to do this. In some instances it was 
able to defer medical questions to the National Academy of 
Science’s Institute of Medicine (IOM), one of the few 
organizations that enjoyed a general (though not universal) level 
of trust on all sides. In some instances it was able to rely on 
general compromises made in the tort system through what I 
will call a “settlement” model. And in some cases, it simply 
punted medical issues to Physicians Panels for case-by-case 
resolution (notwithstanding the inefficiencies that would have 
introduced into the administrative process). Much of what was 
done was ingenious, but, at the end of the day, it was not 
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enough. 
II.  THE FAIR ACT’S BASIC STRUCTURE 
The FAIR Act, had it been enacted, would have established 
an administrative scheme for the compensation of asbestos-
related diseases.32 The program would have been administered 
by an administrator in the Department of Labor, and would have 
been paid for by assessments on asbestos defendants and 
insurers.33
The program was designed to be a no-fault compensation 
system with an emphasis on efficiency. Because the system was 
“no-fault,” it would no longer have been necessary for claimants 
to link their disease with any defendant.34 It would, however, 
still have been necessary to show that the claimant’s disease was 
actually caused by asbestos. 
The administrative provisions of the FAIR Act were for the 
most part hammered out in discussions between representatives 
of organized labor, defendants, and insurers. The administration 
would have been non-adversarial, reflecting the point of view of 
the AFL-CIO. In some medical categories, compensation would 
have been extremely fast and certain. For example, claimants 
for mesothelioma (a deadly cancer whose only known cause is 
asbestos exposure) would have been able to recover based only 
on a reliable diagnosis of mesothelioma and evidence of some 
identifiable exposure to asbestos. In other categories, however, 
claims would have been subject to more searching scrutiny. For 
example, household (or “take-home”) exposure claims for 
diseases other than mesothelioma would have been considered 
by a Physicians Panel for an individualized determination of 
32 S. 3274, § 2 (b). 
33 S. 3274, §§ 101 (b) (appointment of Administrator), 202 (a) 
(defendant funding), 212 (a) (insurer funding). The bill would also have 
swept into the program the assets of bankruptcy trusts, which are successors 
to the liabilities of defendants that have been reorganized under the 
bankruptcy laws. Id. § 402 (f). 
34 S. 3274, § 112 (2006). 
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causation.35 The underlying concept was to provide relatively 
light review in situations where the probability of error was 
small and more searching scrutiny in situations that were more 
problematic. 
The FAIR Act emphasized the importance of ensuring the 
quality of the data used in the administrative process.36 All 
medical tests had to meet applicable standards regarding 
equipment, testing methods and procedures.37 Diagnoses of non-
cancerous conditions had to be based on physical examinations 
performed by a diagnosing physician and x-rays read by a 
qualified B-reader, and they also had to consider exposure and 
smoking history.38 All information provided in support of a 
claim was subject to audit,39 and there were specific 
requirements for the auditing of B-readings and smoking 
assessments.40 The Administrator also had the authority to 
request additional information, including new x-rays or CT 
scans.41
The bill provided for outreach by the Administrator to 
35 Id. § 121 (c) (3). The typical “take-home” exposure occurs when a 
worker brings asbestos home on his clothes, and his spouse is exposed while 
doing the wash. These cases can also involve the worker’s children. See 
Patrick M. Hanlon and Elizabeth Runyan Geise, Asbestos Reform—Past & 
Future, MEALEY’S LITIGATION REPORTS: ASBESTOS.v. 22, no. 5, at 43-44 
(April 4, 2007)  
36 Quality control of the data submitted in support of an application was 
especially important because of the history of medical fraud and abuse that 
has made asbestos litigation such a scandal. See generally the comments of 
Judge Janice Graham Jack, In re Silica Products Liability Litigation, 398 F. 
Supp. 2d 563, 596-637 (S.D. Tex. 2005), which emphasize the similarity 
between silica and asbestos litigation in this regard. 
37 S. 3274, § 121 (b) (3). 
38 Id. § 121 (b) (2) (A) The physical examination and B-reading 
requirements (but not the smoking-history requirement) were excused for 
deceased claimants. Id. § 121 (b) (2) (B). 
39 Id. § 115 (a) (1). 
40 Id. §§ 115 (b), (c). The auditing of B-reader reports is not just a 
system function but can affect individual claims. 
41 Id. § 121 (b) (3). 
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inform potential claimants of the availability of the program.42 
Claimants did not have to be represented by attorneys, and 
attorneys’ fees were limited to 5 percent of the claimant’s 
recovery.43 Adverse decisions by the administrator were 
reviewable in the Court of Appeals for the area where the 
claimant resided when his application was filed.44
The bill would have established nine disease “levels” with 
exposure and medical criteria and an award value for each one. 
Occupational exposure was generally required for all disease 
categories other than mesothelioma,45 although as discussed 
below, people with non-occupational exposures could recover in 
some circumstances. The statutory disease levels are summarized 
in Table 1. 
42 Id. §§ 104 (a), 225 (b). The bill also provided for a medical screening 
program whose primary purpose was to identify potential claimants. See 
generally id. § 225(c). 
43 See S. 3274, § 104 (e). S. 3274 would have allowed a reasonable fee 
in excess of 5 percent in the event of a successful administrative appeal. Id. § 
104 (e) (1) (B). The attorney fee limitation did not apply to judicial review. 
44 Id. § 302(a). 
45 The occupational exposure requirement is incorporated into the 
medical criteria of each of the disease levels from I to VIII. Id. §§ 121 (d) 
(1)-(8). Level IX—Mesothelioma does not require exposure to be 
occupational. Id. § 121 (d) (9) (B). 
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Table 1: Disease Levels and Award Amounts Under the S. 852 
Level I – Unimpaired Non-Malignant Conditions receive 
reimbursement for medical monitoring but no monetary 
compensation  
Level II 
Mixed 
Obstructive– 
Restrictive 
Disease 
$25,000 Level VI  
“Other Cancer” $200,000 
Level III 
Asbestos 
Disease with 
impairment 
$100,000 
Level VII 
Lung Cancer 
without 
Asbestosis 
$300,000[s] 
$725,000[x] 
$800,000[n] 
Level IV 
Asbestos 
Disease with 
More Severe 
Impairment 
$400,000 
Level VIII 
Lung Cancer 
with Asbestosis 
$600,000[s] 
$925,000[x] 
$1,100,000 [n] 
Level V 
Asbestos 
Disease with 
Most Severe 
Impairment 
$850,000 Level IX Mesothelioma $1,100,000 
Note: Smoking status, indicated by [s] = smoker, [x] = former 
smoker, and [n] = non-smoker.  
 
Claimants who did not meet the exposure and medical 
criteria for any disease level could seek compensation on the 
basis of an individualized review by a Physicians Panel as an 
“exceptional medical claim.”46 Several kinds of claim that 
present special difficulties of proof were also sent to the 
Physicians Panels. These included claims based on “take-home” 
exposures and claims for cancers other than mesothelioma and 
lung cancer.47
                                                          
46 Id. § 121 (g). 
47 Id. § 121 (c). In litigation, most of “take home” situations involve 
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Although the bill referred to the various disease categories as 
“levels,” that only meant that award values increased from level 
to level. For example, a claimant with lung cancer might be in 
Level VII or Level VIII. The difference in compensation 
between those two categories does not relate to how sick the 
claimants are, but to the strength of their causation evidence. 
Similarly, a person who qualified for Level II could be much 
more seriously impaired than many who qualified for Level III. 
The difference in compensation is due to the fact that most 
Level II cases will be primarily due to chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease (e.g., emphysema or chronic bronchitis, both 
caused by smoking) with relatively weak evidence of an asbestos 
connection, while Level III cases have a clearer link to asbestos 
exposure. 
The FAIR Act would have been financed by defendants (up 
to $90 billion), insurers (up to $46.25 billion), and asbestos 
trusts established as a result of chapter 11 reorganizations of 
previous defendants such as Johns Manville (expected to amount 
to $4 billion).48 The defendants’ contributions were based on a 
complex and exception-riddled set of formulas that took into 
account (1) whether they were in bankruptcy or not (the 
bankrupts paid more), (2) how large their previous asbestos 
expenditures had been, and (3) how big they were (measured by 
gross revenues).49 The insurers’ contribution would have been 
determined after enactment by an Asbestos Insurance 
Commission.50 The bill would have channeled essentially all of 
mesothelioma claims. The bill did not require those claims to be referred to a 
Physician’s Panel, but did it require an individualized determination of 
causation when other diseases are involved. For “other cancer” claims, see 
infra notes 65-73. 
48 S. 3274, §§ 202 (a) (1) (defendants), 212 (c) (2) (insurers), 402 (f) 
(trusts). Section 402(f) requires transfer of substantially all trust assets (which 
would have exceeded $4 billion), but payments made into trusts established 
after a certain date would have been subject to credits against the defendants’ 
and insurers’ obligations. Id. § 420 (f) As a result, the estimated proceeds 
from the trusts were fixed at $4 billion. 
49 Id. §§ 202-205. 
50 Id. § 212. 
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the trusts’ assets for the payment of future bodily injury claims 
into the national fund.51
Since the funding for the FAIR Act was capped at about 
$140 billion, it was extremely important to be sure that this 
amount was enough. Compared to the expected cost of the tort 
system, funding seemed ample. Respected estimates of future 
costs of the tort system as of 2002 were in a range of $130 to 
$195 billion—and that was a system in which almost 60 percent 
of the total cost went to lawyers and experts for both sides.52 
The FAIR Act’s non-adversarial structure should have greatly 
reduced transaction costs (essentially eliminating the defense side 
in favor of a more efficient administrative structure and 
significantly restricting claimants’ costs). Moreover, between 
2002, when the cost estimates were made, and 2006, when the 
FAIR Act came to a vote, several billion dollars had been spent 
in settling claims or paying judgments, presumably reducing the 
amount of future claims that would be addressed by the bill. All 
of this presumed, however, that claiming in the administrative 
system would resemble claiming in the tort system. That in turn 
depended on how the bill’s eligibility criteria would work in 
practice. 
If the expectations of the bill’s sponsors were disappointed, 
and the Fund ran out of money, the bill required the program to 
sunset.53 However, many senators, especially conservative 
opponents, believed that future Congresses would not allow the 
program to end once it became established.54 The general lack 
51 Id. § 402 (f). 
52 As of 2002, past costs were approximately $70 billion and estimates 
of total costs ranged from $200 billion (Tillinghast) to $265 billion 
(Millman). Thus, estimated future costs ranged from $130 to $195 billion. 
These were, of course, in nominal dollars, not present value. RAND Report, 
supra note 5, at 92, 105. The RAND Report estimated that historically only 
42 percent of the money spent on asbestos litigation reached plaintiffs—the 
rest was spent on transaction costs, primarily defense costs and plaintiffs’ 
attorneys’ fees. Id. at 104. 
53 S. 3274, § 405 (f). 
54 See testimony of Douglas Holtz-Eakin, supra note 28. The author 
often encountered similar views in discussions with members and staff. 
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of faith in the sunset provisions of the bill put even more 
pressure on certainty that the bill’s eligibility criteria would 
work as expected. 
III.  CONTESTED GROUND 
A.  An Overview 
At the outset, it is useful to consider how eligibility 
requirements and award values ought to be set. There are at 
least two basic approaches: the medical model, where eligibility 
criteria are based on the best medical evidence, and the 
settlement model, which bases eligibility on the practices 
followed in the tort system except where Congress believes 
those practices should be overridden for policy reasons.55
The FAIR Act mainly followed the settlement model. 
Because asbestos was a mature mass tort, what claimants 
received in the tort system would be at least the point of 
departure for determining the fairness of award values. 
Moreover, fundamental disagreements on medical issues tended 
to discourage compromise, while the use of a settlement model 
based on previous compromises tended to facilitate it. 
Nevertheless, several difficulties arose from the use of the 
settlement model to establish eligibility. First, because the model 
is built on compromise, the bill was always open to the 
accusation of paying people who should not be paid or not 
paying people who should be (based on partisan views of the 
medical evidence).56
55 Elegy, supra note 30, at 550-51. 
56 For an excellent expression of this disquiet, see S. REP. NO. 108-18, 
at 98-103 (2003) (Additional Views of Senator Jon Kyl). Senator Kyl’s 
summary of the medical issues was based upon statements from very well 
respected doctors and scientists—all of which were associated with the 
defendants’ point of view. See id. The opinions of those doctors were 
rejected by many other well respected doctors and scientists who were 
associated with the plaintiffs’ point of view. See id. To rely on one set of 
doctors rather than another is more or less what a jury does when it decides 
for the plaintiff or the defendant. That approach doesn’t lend itself to a 
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Second, settlement patterns in the tort system tend to reflect 
typical situations, while legislation must be drafted to deal with 
situations that may be rare in litigation but are important to 
members of Congress. Thus, for example, there are very few 
cases in the tort system that involve non-occupational exposures 
(if “take-home” exposure is considered occupational), but non-
occupational exposure is, as shown below, an explosive political 
issue. 
Third, the settlement model reflects settlement practices 
based on a particular state of medical technology.57 But the 
FAIR Act was designed to last for 50 years or more. 
Technological change will inevitably change the assumptions on 
which model settlement patterns were based. The controversy 
over CT scans, discussed below, illustrates this difficulty. 
With these overarching considerations in mind, we shall turn 
to two difficult areas—the Act’s medical categories and proof of 
exposure. 
B.  The Medical Categories 
Not all of the medical categories of the FAIR Act were 
controversial. For example, one of the pillars of the FAIR Act 
was its choice to provide only medical monitoring, and not 
monetary compensation, for unimpaired non-malignant claims 
(Level I).58 This policy was probably the most important 
override of tort system practices. Other medical categories were 
also mostly uncontroversial.59 The controversy revolved around 
“mixed” obstructive-restrictive disease (Level II), “other 
cancers” (Level VI), and lung cancer without asbestosis (Level 
VII). 
legislative process based on coalition building where the stakes are large and 
the science unclear. 
57 S. 3274, § 131 (b) (1). 
58 Id. 
59 Uncontroversial categories include mesothelioma (Level IX), lung 
cancer with asbestosis (Level VIII), and most non-malignant diseases (Levels 
III through V). Elegy, supra note 30, at 551-52. 
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1.  Level II: Mixed Obstructive-Restrictive Disease 
The theory behind Level II is that for some people asbestos-
related “restrictive” diseases may contribute to impairment that 
is caused primarily by chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. 
Standard pulmonary function tests do not detect such dual-cause 
impairment.60 In the tort system, such cases receive, if anything, 
much lower settlements than claims involving impairment that 
has a clearer relationship to asbestos-related disease. 
The tort-system compromise was carried over into Level II 
under the FAIR Act. The award value for that category was 
only $25,000.61 However, while the bill’s general approach to 
Level II had roots in the tort system, its specific criteria were a 
 60 The bill relied upon two pulmonary function tests. One, “total lung 
capacity” or “TLC” measures the total volume of the lungs including both 
“vital capacity,” the volume of air a person breathes in and out, and the 
“residual volume,” which is the volume of air that is always in the lungs. 
Obstructive lung disease often increases TLC, because an increase in the 
residual volume due to the trapping of air in the lungs more than compensates 
for a reduction in vital capacity. Since the bill detected impairment by a 
reduction in total lung capacity, it was theoretically possible that over-
inflation would offset the reduction in lung capacity due to asbestosis, thus 
disguising an impairment that is in part asbestos-related. See Scott Barnhart, 
et al., Total Lung Capacity: an Insensitive Measure of Impairment in Patients 
with Asbestosis and Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease?, 93-2 CHEST 
299 (1988). The other major way of determining impairment was to look at 
“forced vital capacity” or “FVC”), basically the amount of air a person can 
exhale with maximum effort. FVC decreases in the case of both obstructive 
and restrictive disease. However, the ratio between the amount of air people 
can exhale in the first second (called FEV1) and the total amount they can 
exhale tends to decrease if obstructive disease is present. INTERMOUNTAIN 
THORACIC SOCIETY, CLINICAL PULMONARY FUNCTION TESTING 6 (2d ed. 
1984). The FAIR Act would have weeded out obstructive disease by 
imposing a limit on the permissible decline of FEV1/FVC. But that decline 
just shows the presence of obstruction; it does not necessarily exclude the 
possibility that a restrictive disease such as asbestosis may make some 
contribution to the overall fall in forced vital capacity. 
61 By comparison, a claimant who qualifies for Level III (which involves 
less impairment but a greater probability of asbestos causation) would receive 
$100,000. S. 3274, § 203 (g) (2) (C). 
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troubling product of legislative bargaining. The principle 
underlying Level II was supposed to be that mixed obstructive-
restrictive disease should be inferred when the x-ray evidence of 
an asbestos contribution is especially strong. For that reason, the 
minimum ILO score to qualify for compensation was set at 
1/1—one step higher than the minimum abnormal reading of 
1/0.62 However, it was still possible to qualify for Level II 
based on pleural plaques (which do not involve any scarring of 
lung tissue), without any asbestosis at all.63 Moreover, an ILO 
score of 1/1 was a relaxed test for showing that an asbestos-
related condition contributed something to impairment related to 
obstructive lung diseases. The American Bar Association’s 
recommended medical criteria, adopted in 2003, would have 
required an ILO score of 2/1 or higher in a similar situation.64
62 S 3274, § 121 (d) (2). The ILO system for reading chest x-rays was 
initially developed for the purpose of assuring consistency in epidemiological 
studies of lung diseases, but it has been widely used as a diagnostic tool in 
administrative and judicial proceedings relating to a variety of lung 
conditions. People qualified on the basis of an examination to apply the ILO 
system—so-called “B” readers—look at the profusion, size, shape, and 
location of opacities on x-ray films. Profusion is the concentration of small 
opacities in a unit area in an x-ray film. It may indicated interstitial fibrosis—
scarring in the parenchyma or tissue of the lung—while location and size and 
shape provide an indication of whether scarring is due to asbestos, silica, or 
other causes. Profusion is rated on a 12 point scale in the form of A/B. A is 
the B reader’s final judgment on the degree of profusion, with 0 being 
normal and 3 being most abnormal. B indicates whether the reader considered 
rating profusion one more or less than the score shown by A. Thus, for 
example, a 1/0 reading indicates that the reader decided that profusion was a 
“1”—, the minimum abnormal level—but seriously considered the possibility 
that it was a “0”—normal. A 1/0 x-ray is therefore the lowest abnormal 
level. A 1/1 x-ray, in contrast, is unambiguously abnormal, but still involves 
a relatively low level of profusion. The use of the ILO classification system 
is described in INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, GUIDELINES FOR 
THE USE OF THE ILO INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF RADIOGRAPHS OF 
PNEUMOCONIOSES, REVISED EDITION 2000 at 3-6 (2002). 
63 See S. Rep. 109-97, at 100. 
64 In February 2003, the American Bar Association House of Delegates 
recommended the adoption of medical criteria legislation that would defer the 
claims of the unimpaired. See ABA Standard for Non Malignant Asbestos 
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2.  Level VI “Other Cancer” 
While the evidence is clear that asbestos causes lung cancer 
and mesothelioma, other cancers are arguably due to asbestosis 
as well. Some of these cancers are very common, while others 
are rare.65 The epidemiological evidence in favor of general 
causation is relatively weak for all of these cancers, but it is 
strong enough as a practical matter to allow “other cancer” 
cases to get to a jury in many jurisdictions. Thus, depending on 
the jurisdiction, these cases have settlement value. 66
Level VI presented in acute form the problem of reconciling 
medical and settlement models. Since Level VI cancers had 
value in the tort system, the settlement model suggested that 
they should be compensated—if on a discounted basis—under the 
Act. And in fact, the bill provided as a default option that Level 
VI cancer claimants would receive $200,000, a small fraction of 
the amount received for lung cancer or mesothelioma. The 
medical model, however, suggested that some or all of the 
“other cancers” should receive nothing at all. 
Related Disease Claims February 2003. Such legislation necessarily results in 
binary, “go” and “no-go” decisions: it is impossible to compromise by 
discounting awards. An objection to medical criteria is that it rules out the 
claims of people who are impaired by obstructive disease but who have a 
strong case that there is some asbestos contribution to their impairment. To 
address this situation, the ABA recommended allowing plaintiffs to pursue 
their cases in court if they had sufficiently strong radiographic evidence of 
asbestosis (an ILO reading of 2/1). Id. at 1-2. 
65 By far the most prevalent of the “other cancers” is colorectal cancer. 
See AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, CANCER FACTS & FIGURES 2006, 4 (2006). 
According to the American Cancer Society, an estimated 148,610 new cases 
of cancer of the colon or rectum will be diagnosed in 2006. Id. The estimated 
incidence of the other cancers in Level VI is 8,950 (pharynx), 14,550 
(esophagus), 22.800 (stomach), and larynx (9,510). Id. These rates are for 
both sexes. Since substantial asbestos exposure took place primarily among 
males, it is also useful to look at incidence among men: colon and rectum 
(72,800), pharynx (6,820), esophagus (11,260), stomach (13,400), and larynx 
(7,700). Id. 
66 For this reason, “trust distribution procedures” of bankruptcy trusts, 
which tend to reflect settlement practices, compensate most or all of the 
Level VI cancers. 
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In most instances, the FAIR Act followed the settlement 
model and did not attempt to resolve medical issues. With 
regard to the “other cancers,” however, it took a different tack. 
There were three reasons for this. First, because “other cancer” 
cases were rarely pursued in the tort system, those who saw 
themselves as claimant advocates did not have a strong reason to 
resist forcing the medical issues. Second, the defense side feared 
that the a no-fault system might attract a large volume of claims 
that currently were not made in the tort system. Because some 
of the “other cancers”—especially colon cancer—were common, 
the financial consequences of a significant increase in claims for 
“other cancer” could threaten the viability of the entire program. 
Thus, defendants and insurers were willing to press for a 
medically based decision. Finally, each side was confident that a 
neutral arbiter would favor its position. 
Thus, the FAIR Act would have required the Institute of 
Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences (“IOM”) to 
study the scientific literature on causation and to determine 
which if any of the Level VI cancers could be caused by 
asbestos.67 If the IOM decided that a particular cancer was not 
caused by asbestos, that cancer could no longer be compensated 
under the Act.68
As it turned out, Senator Specter, the bill’s Republican co-
sponsor, secured an appropriation to fund the IOM study in 
anticipation of enactment of the bill. Through a contract with the 
National Institutes of Health, the IOM established a committee 
to determine whether there is a causal relationship between 
asbestos and colorectal, laryngeal, esophageal, pharyngeal, or 
stomach cancers.69 The committee was chaired by Dr. Jonathan 
67 § 3274, § 121(e) 
68 Id. 
69 INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS. ASBESTOS: SELECTED CANCERS 
6-7 (2006). The development of the IOM analysis of “other cancers” is 
described in Jonathan M. Samet, Asbestos and Causation of Non-Respiratory 
Cancers: Evaluation by the Institute of Medicine, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1117 
(2007) The decision to refer Level VI claims to the IOM was originally made 
in 2003 and was not controversial thereafter. Accordingly, neither the 
stakeholders nor the senators ever had an occasion to scrutinize rigorously the 
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Samet of Johns Hopkins University (an eminent epidemiologist 
with no previous connection to asbestos litigation) and issued its 
report in June 2006. The committee found that there was 
“sufficient” evidence of asbestos causation—the standard 
envisioned by the sponsors of the bill—only in the case of 
laryngeal cancer—which represents roughly 5 percent of the 
cancers listed under Level VI.70
While general causation of the various “other cancers” was 
left to the experts at the IOM, the eligibility criteria for the 
cancers that were found to be caused by asbestos were set forth 
in the bill. These criteria were not based on medicine—how 
could they be, when they applied to several different cancers 
some of which might not be caused by asbestos at all? They 
were based on settlement practices in the tort litigation. An 
“other cancer” claimant could therefore recover by showing 15 
weighted years of exposure plus the presence of non-malignant 
asbestos-related disease (which could include either asbestosis or 
pleural disease).71 Both years of exposure and presence of a 
standards that should be applied to evaluating cancer causation in the study. 
For example, the level of evidence that ruled a cancer in or out was not made 
clear, and the committee had to do its best with an ambiguous charge. As a 
result, some Congressional staff raised what were basically policy questions 
as to whether a cancer should be included in Level VI if there was merely 
“suggestive” evidence of a causal relationship to asbestos. Id. at 1130. 
Similarly, no one ever asked the IOM to decide what the appropriate medical 
criteria would be if it found that asbestos was a general cause of a certain 
kind of cancer. Such questions would have raised important policy issues that 
could have made the basic strategy of the negotiators—deferring resolution of 
the medical issue to a trusted medical expert—impossible. The essence of that 
strategy was an attempt to transform a policy question into a technical one.  
70 Id. According to the American Cancer Society, estimated new cases of 
the “other cancers” included in Level VI for 2007 is 213,680, while the 
estimate for laryngeal cancer was 11,300. American Cancer Society, Cancer 
Facts and Figures 2007, at 4 (“Estimated New Cancer Cases and Deaths by 
Sex for All Sites 2007”). 
71 The FAIR Act weights exposure based on occupational setting and 
when the exposure took place. Thus, for example, one year of exposure 
working in shipyards in World War II is worth 4 years of exposure working 
around asbestos in an ordinary setting. Moreover, exposures after 1986 are 
weighted 1/10 and exposures from 1976 through 1986 are weighted 1/2 
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non-malignant disease were indirect indicators that the claimant 
had a great deal of exposure. No one argued that asbestosis or 
pleural disease was an independent cause of any of these 
cancers. In short, the logic behind the criteria was the logic of 
settlement, not the logic of science. 
Conservative skeptics thought that the absence of a scientific 
basis for the Level VI criteria would allow many people whose 
cancer was not caused by asbestos to qualify for payment. 
Because some of the “other cancers”—especially colon cancer—
were quite prevalent, the skeptics worried that paying “false 
positives” could undermine the financial viability of the 
program, resulting in its collapse—and pressure for a federal 
bailout.72 This disquiet was exacerbated by the possibility that 
changes in diagnostic technology—particularly developments in 
CT scans and other imaging techniques—could make the 
practical compromise reflected in the other-cancer criteria 
unreasonable. This problem affects other medical categories as 
well, especially Level VII lung cancers, and is discussed in Part 
II (B)(4) below.73
because increasingly stringent regulation reduced exposure levels over time. 
See S. 3274, 109th Cong. § 121 (a) (16) (2006). 
72 See American Cancer Society, supra note 70, at 4 (estimating the 
incidence of new colon and rectal cancers in 2007 as 112, 340 and 41, 420, 
respectively). 
73 A second problem with Level VI was the possibility that criteria 
workable in one institutional arrangement (the tort system and bankruptcy 
trusts) might encourage a flood of new claims in a different arrangement (a 
no-fault compensation scheme). See Charles E. Bates and Charles H. Mullin, 
Analysis of S. 852 Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution (FAIR) Act 2 
(2005) (“The Fair Act would create entitlements for many people with lung 
and other cancers who were not compensated in the historical tort 
environment.”). This possibility, while important for Level VI, is even more 
important in Level VII (lung cancer claims without asbestosis). The problem 
here is not necessarily that undeserving claims would be compensated, but 
rather that a reduction in transaction costs in a no-fault administrative system 
would greatly increase the rate of claiming (whether the medical criteria are 
valid or not). This issue lies at the heart of concerns about the financial 
viability of the program. 
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3.  Level VII—Lung Cancer without Asbestosis 
It is generally agreed that lung cancer in a person who has 
both extensive exposure to asbestos and asbestosis may be 
attributed to the asbestos exposure. The FAIR Act addressed this 
easy case in Level VIII—Lung Cancer With Asbestosis. The 
controversy arises when the individual does not have asbestosis. 
Experts argue over whether lung cancer can be attributed to 
asbestos exposure only if asbestosis is diagnosed or whether 
such an attribution can be made even in the absence of 
asbestosis if exposure levels are high enough.74 The FAIR Act 
compromised. Level VII—lung cancer without asbestosis—
followed the more liberal view that the presence of asbestosis 
was not an absolute prerequisite for a finding of causation—as 
long as there was sufficient exposure. The bill adopted a 
heightened exposure requirement (12 weighted years) and also 
required pleural changes (which are a confirmation of exposure). 
Then, in recognition of the fact that Level VII allows an award 
with weaker evidence of causation, the bill reduced the award 
value in Level VII (as compared to Level VIII).75 This 
74 For the view that asbestosis is a prerequisite for attributing lung 
cancer to asbestos exposure, see R. Jones, Asbestos Exposure and Thoracic 
Neoplasms, SEMINARS IN ROENTGENOLOGY, v. XXVII, No. 2 94 (April 
1992); W. Weiss, Asbestosis: A Marker for the Increased risk of Lung 
Cancer Among Workers Exposed to Asbestos, 115 CHEST 536 (1998); Letter 
of James R. Crapo to Sen. Jon Kyl (July 22, 2003), appendix E to Additional 
Views of Sen. Jon Kyl, SEN. REP. 108-118, at 64-65 (2003). For the contrary 
view see D. Egilman & A. Reinert, Lung Cancer and Asbestos Exposure: 
Asbestosis is Not Necessary, 20 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 398 (1996); Consensus 
Report, Asbestos, Asbestosis, and Cancer: The Helsinki Criteria for 
Diagnosis and Attribution, SCAND. J. WORK. ENVIRON. HEALTH 1997; 23: 
311, 314 (“Heavy exposure, in the absence of radiologically diagnosed 
asbestosis, is sufficient to increase the risk of lung cancer.”). 
75 For smokers, the value of a Level VII lung cancer claim is $300,000, 
as opposed to $600,000 for a Level VIII claim. Previous versions of the 
FAIR Act allowed lung cancer claimants to establish causation on the basis of 
asbestos exposure alone, even in the absence of pleural changes confirming 
actual exposure. S. 2290, 108th Cong. § 121 (d) (7) (2004); S. 1125, 108th 
Cong. § 121 (d) (7) (2003) (reported). In a major concession to the 
Republicans on the Judiciary Committee, however, Senators Specter and 
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maneuver—reducing the claim value in return for less restrictive 
eligibility criteria—is a hallmark of the settlement model. In 
situations where causation is unclear, the medical model 
suggests a very different approach: strengthening the eligibility 
criteria and then paying those who pass the tighter criteria the 
same amount of money as others with the same disease. The 
medical model can only work, however, if Congress resolves the 
scientific dispute over whether in fact lung cancer can be 
attributed to asbestos if the claimant does not have asbestosis. 
Congress does not have the expertise to resolve scientific 
questions in that way, and so its instinct is to turn medical 
questions into political questions, by way of compromise.76
The FAIR Act’s treatment of lung cancers without asbestosis 
was by far the most controversial eligibility issue. Getting the 
lung cancer criteria wrong could have tremendous consequences. 
The American Cancer Society estimates that 213,380 lung 
cancers (114,760) in men) will be diagnosed in 2007.77 If too 
stringent, the lung cancer criteria could deprive many dying 
people of compensation; if not stringent enough, the flood of 
claims could doom the system. 
Although the lung cancer question could not be resolved on 
the basis of the medical model, the settlement model had its own 
problems. In part the problem was due to the fact that exposure 
reconstruction is expensive, time consuming, and uncertain. 
Leahy agreed in spring of 2005 to delete the relevant medical category (the 
“old” Level VII) from the current version of the bill. This concession 
provoked the ire of some Senate Democrats, led by Senator Edward M. 
Kennedy, who sought to restore the old Level VII category or at least allow 
claimants who would have qualified under Level VII to bring asbestos claims 
in the tort system. 152 Cong. Rec. S1265 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2006) 
(amendment proposed by Sen. Kennedy). 
76 Conservatives would have preferred to eliminate Level VII altogether, 
thus in effect siding with those who believed that lung cancer cannot be 
attributed to asbestos in the absence of asbestosis. However, too many 
responsible experts disagreed with that conclusion to make that outcome 
possible. But see Bailey v. Mobil Oil Corp., 187 S.W.3d 265 (Tex. App. 
2006) (excluding expert testimony that a smoker’s lung cancer was due to 
asbestos without a concomitant finding of asbestosis). 
77 See American Cancer Society, supra note 70, at 4. 
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Thus, eligibility cannot practically be premised on direct 
estimates of exposure. In level VII, the drafters of the bill relied 
on two indirect indicators of exposure—the number of years 
spent in occupations characterized by exposure to asbestos 
during particular periods and the presence of pleural changes. 
These indicators were only roughly related to the threshold of 
exposure that many experts thought was necessary for an 
attribution of lung cancer to asbestos. Moreover, the prevalence 
of pleural changes, in particular, depended on diagnostic 
techniques, and a move from standard x-rays to CT scans had 
the potential of greatly increasing the number of lung cancer 
sufferer who could meet the bill’s criteria for compensation. 
Since lung cancer values were thought to be high compared to 
tort system values, there was a substantial concern that the Level 
VII category might bankrupt the program.78
Interestingly, in 2005, the English also confronted the 
problem of deciding whether and when lung cancers without 
asbestos should be compensated as asbestos-related. The English 
Industrial Injuries Benefits Scheme pays benefits to workers with 
prescribed asbestos-related diseases.79 In 2005, the Industrial 
Injuries Advisory Council recommended a number of changes in 
the program’s prescription for lung cancer (essentially, the 
78 See C. Bates & C. Mullin, supra note 73. As is true of other scientific 
issues, the number of people who would qualify for compensation under 
Level VII was disputed. See Recent Developments in Assessing Future 
Asbestos Claims Under the FAIR Act: Hearing before the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statements of witnesses Douglas Holtz-
Eakin, Laura Welch, & Denise Martin), available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1682. At the end of the day, 
however, science could not resolve this argument. Opponents of the bill 
wanted a level of certainty that no one could provide, because the 
consequences of being wrong were so great and because they didn’t believe 
that the safety valve provided by the bill’s sunset provisions would actually 
work. Supporters, who assumed the bill would be implemented as written, 
were prepared to rely on what they considered to be the preponderance of the 
evidence. 
79 See N.J. WIKELY, COMPENSATION FOR INDUSTRIAL DISEASE 60-65 
(1993). 
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eligibility criteria).80 The Council found, first of all, that “where 
asbestosis is present when lung cancer is diagnosed, the lung 
cancer can be attributed with reasonable certainty to previous 
asbestos exposure.”81 Turning to the harder problem, it 
concluded that a “substantial exposure” to asbestos doubled the 
risk of lung cancer even in the absence of clinical evidence of 
asbestosis.82 Thus, the Council had to devise a practical way of 
determining whether exposure was sufficiently “substantial” to 
allow for compensation. One option would be to require 
claimants to quantify their exposure, but the Council recognized 
that that would not be workable in a scheme not “based on an 
individual proof system.”83 It also rejected the continued use of 
diffuse pleural thickening as a criterion for a lung cancer award 
because it thought diffuse pleural thickening was an “unreliable” 
indicator of asbestos exposure.84 The Council solved its problem 
by selecting a limited number of jobs that typically involved 
exposures to asbestos in amounts sufficient to double the risk of 
lung cancer.85 The Council’s recommendations were 
80 DEPARTMENT FOR WORK & PENSIONS, ASBESTOS RELATED DISEASES: 
REPORT OF INDUSTRIAL DISEASES ADVISORY COUNCIL 16-19 (July 2005). The 
Government endorsed these proposed changes, see Department for Work & 
Pensions, Press Release—Changes to the Schedule of Prescribed Diseases— 
Asbestos Related Diseases (July 14, 2007), available at http://dpw.gov.uk/ 
mediacentre/pressreleases/2005/ju/cdis014.asp (last checked May 31, 2007). 
The Advisory Council’s recommendations were implemented in April 2006. 
See SI 2006/638, The Pneumoconiosis, Byssinosis, and Miscellaneous 
Diseases Benefit (Amendment) Scheme 2006, at 2. The current list of 
prescribed diseases is found at Department for Work & Pension, Guide to 
Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefits, Appendix 1: List of Diseases 
Covered by the Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit at D8A, available at 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/advisers/db1/appendix/appendix1.asp (last checked 
May 31, 2007). 
81 Id. at 17. 
82 Id. (emphasis added). 
83 Id.. 
84 Id. 
85 The eligible jobs were asbestos textile workers, asbestos sprayers, 
asbestos insulation workers including those applying and removing asbestos 
containing-material in shipbuilding. For exposures occurring before 1975, 
workers must be in the listed occupation for 5 years; for exposure after that 
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incorporated into the schedule of prescribed diseases in April 
2006. 
The British experience highlights the conceptual difficulty in 
solving the lung cancer problem, even where it is not heavily 
politicized. Congress had the same challenge, but less leeway. 
The essential difficulty is to develop a satisfactory way to 
measure exposure. There were a number of options. First, 
Congress might have committed determinations of causation to 
the discretion of Physicians Panels. This option, however, would 
have made the operation of the lung cancer criteria completely 
unpredictable and would have had no support from any quarter. 
Second, Congress might have required more extensive pleural 
changes to qualify for a lung cancer award. This expedient 
would have preserved the basic structure of the act but moved 
the threshold for recovery a bit more in the defendants’ 
direction. Because the connection between pleural changes and 
lung cancer is somewhat arbitrary (as the Industrial Injury 
Advisory Council found), this would not have responded 
effectively to fears that lung cancers would destabilize the 
finances of the program. Third, it could have adopted a 
quantitative threshold for measuring cumulative past exposures. 
That, however, would have had large transaction costs, and 
since it would often be impossible to prove exposure with any 
certainty, the program would have been under heavy pressure to 
adopt presumptions or other expedients to ease the burden of 
proof. And, finally, it could have followed the example of the 
British Industrial Injuries Advisory Council in adopting a more 
restricted list of the occupations and industries where 
employment would give rise to an inference of occupational 
exposure. 
These options could have been used singly or in 
combination. All would have presented policy problems, which 
would quickly have become political problems. There simply 
was no good solution to the lung cancer issue. The stakes were 
too high; the outcome of the settlement model was too uncertain 
when transferred to the administrative context; and the medical 
time, 10-years’ employment in the listed job would be required. Id. at 19. 
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disagreements were too deep. This issue was just too important 
to be left to the doctors—and in fact no one ever suggested 
referring the definition of the lung cancer medical criteria to the 
IOM, which was Congress’s main vehicle for resolving other, 
less critical scientific issues on the merits. Nor could the IOM 
have executed that task without direction based on political 
judgments which related to the very issues that made the 
problem intractable to begin with. 
4.  The CT Scan Issue 
In the discussion to this point, I have repeatedly referred to 
the CT scan problem. This is a particular example of a more 
general phenomenon. Technological change will inevitably lead 
to more sensitive diagnostic techniques. In a medical model, that 
is clearly desirable. If legislation is intended to compensate 
people with a certain diagnosis, then better diagnostic techniques 
necessarily constitute improvements in the program. What’s not 
to like? 
For several reasons the picture changes under a settlement 
model. First, settlements are not judged on the basis of rigor 
and consistency, but practical results. The practical result of 
eligibility criteria depends on the diagnostic methods and 
technology in place when the settlement is negotiated. If the 
parties had contemplated a change in technology, they might 
well have agreed on different terms, which might have included 
stricter eligibility criteria. If this happens, improvements in 
diagnostic techniques do not make the settlement better but 
undermine its foundations. 
This subversive effect is especially important when the 
condition being diagnosed is not the disease that is being 
compensated. This factor makes technological change especially 
important in Level VI—Other Cancer and Level VII—Cancer 
without Asbestosis.86 In those categories, the disease being 
86 While the defect of using pleural changes as a confirmation of 
exposure is especially apparent in lung and other cancer cases, the same 
problem also appears in the non-malignant categories. It is practically 
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compensated is cancer. No one contends the pleural plaques in 
themselves cause, or are a risk factor for, lung or other cancer. 
The presence or absence of pleural plaques is a measurable 
surrogate, or stand in, for a factor that is thought (at least by 
some) to be causally related to these cancers – exposure to 
asbestos. Moreover, the reason that settling parties have 
traditionally looked at pleural plaques as a confirmation of 
substantial exposure is not that there is a close relationship 
between plaques and exposure, but rather there is a general 
relationship and the parties understand what it means in terms of 
the likelihood that claimants will be compensated. There is an 
element of arbitrariness in using a sign in this way, but it is the 
kind of arbitrariness that generally happens when parties engage 
in settling controversies rather than resolving medical questions. 
Rules of thumb of this kind are chosen because the line that is 
drawn has understandable practical consequences: defendants 
know how much they can expect to pay (given the prevalence of 
plaques in the cases submitted to them) and plaintiffs’ counsel 
are willing to accept the rule of thumb as a fair resolution given 
what can be expected at trial. If, as a result of technological 
advances, pleural changes came to be diagnosed more widely 
(and presumably in cases of lesser exposure), the diagnosis 
would be less useful in establishing a sufficient level of exposure 
to cause cancer. In effect, it would be necessary to recalibrate 
the settlement model. In the tort system, this problem would be 
worked out over time in bargaining among the players, but in a 
legislated compensation scheme, there is no such self-correcting 
mechanism. 
C.  Exposure 
All of the medical categories depend on proof of underlying 
exposure, but no one really knows exactly how much exposure 
impossible for pleural plaques by themselves to cause significant breathing 
impairment. However, pleural changes could be an indication of asbestosis 
that isn’t showing up on a chest x-ray, and that asbestosis might cause 
impairment. Here again pleural changes are a partly arbitrary stand-in for the 
real causative factor. 
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any individual has. Unlike some radiation workers, who wear 
badges that purport to measure their cumulative dose of 
radiation, people exposed to asbestos did not have real-time 
monitoring. Indeed, prior to the 1970s, effective monitoring of 
asbestos concentrations in the work environment was 
uncommon; and even if those concentrations were known, 
precise information on where a person worked will be absent.87 
In litigation, the parties sometimes hire dose reconstruction 
experts to try to model the asbestos exposures to which a worker 
was subject. Obviously, however, an administrative 
compensation scheme would break down if dose had to be 
reconstructed by experts in this way.88
Thus, the FAIR Act’s exposure standards were not based on 
measured doses, but rather on inferences from information on 
the industries where the claimant worked and the jobs he held. It 
was critically important that information on employment history 
be complete and detailed—if conclusory assertions regarding 
employment were acceptable, the exposure criteria would cease 
to be meaningful and the medical criteria for all of the disease 
categories in the bill (other than mesothelioma) would be 
undermined. S. 852 as reported was probably deficient in this 
regard, although S. 3274 made some significant 
87 There were no national regulations regarding exposure to asbestos 
until OSHA adopted such regulations in 1971. Those regulation went through 
a number of iterations, but very early on, in June 1972, OSHA required 
workplace exposure monitoring. Because of this regulatory mandate, 
exposure monitorng became widespread during the 1970s. On the history of 
OSHA regulation of asbestos, see John F. Martonik et al., The History of 
OSHA’s Asbestos Rulemakings and Some Distinctive Approaches that They 
Introduced for Regulationg Occupational Exposure to Toxic Substances, 62 
AIHAJ 208 & 211 Table II (2001).  
88 Under the Energy Workers’ Compensation Program, reconstruction of 
claimants’ radiation dose is a major source of delay. General Accountability 
Office, Energy Employees Compensation: Many Claims Have Been 
Processed, but Action Is Needed to Expedite Processing of claims Requiring 
Radiation Exposure Estimates, GAO-04-958, at 17-21 (Sept. 10, 2004). That 
is true, moreover, even though radiation workers subject to that program 
wore badges that kept track of their exposure. Just reading the badges has 
proved to be a time consuming procedure. 
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improvements.89
The second major exposure problem arises from the FAIR 
Act’s focus on occupational exposure to asbestos. This is 
perhaps an inevitable result of thinking in terms of the settlement 
model. In the tort system, lawsuits based on non-occupational 
exposure are very rare, and settlements typically do not address 
such situations.90 Moreover, the drafters assumed that all of the 
diseases compensated under the FAIR Act, other than 
mesothelioma, would require an amount of exposure that could 
not in practice be satisfied except in an occupational setting. 
What works, however, in the rough and ready world of tort 
settlements does not necessarily work in a legislative scheme. 
Non-occupational exposure was politically important for three 
reasons. 
First, at least some of the people exposed to asbestos from 
the W.R. Grace vermiculite mine in Libby, Montana, were 
exposed non-occupationally. The Libby situation was a cause 
celebre which produced a prize-winning series of articles by 
Andrew Schneider in the Seattle Intelligencer, a follow-on book, 
and some gripping television in which Mr. Schneider incredibly 
claimed that the main purpose of the FAIR Act was to address 
the Libby experience.91 While Libby might have been peripheral 
89 Section § 121 (c) (2) in S. 3274, while continuing to allow claimants 
to prove exposure by affidavit, would have required such affidavits to be 
“detailed and specific.” Id. This combined with detailed submission 
requirements relating to employment and exposure would provide the 
Administrator with a sufficient record to evaluate allegations of exposure, and 
§ 121 (c) (2) (C) allows him to require additional information if necessary. 
None of this is perfect. Employment records typically show no more than the 
fact of employment and (sometimes) occupation, and coworker testimony in 
the asbestos context is not very reliable. The program would inevitably 
depend on the claimant’s sworn testimony to some extent, and the hope of the 
bill’s supporters was that the penalties for fraud combined with the need to 
provide specific statements that could in principle be verified will keep false 
statements down to a manageable level. Exactly the same problem bedevils in 
the tort system, of course. 
90 Take-home exposure is classified for this purpose, as it is under the 
FAIR Act, as occupational exposure. 
91 Libby, Montana is the site of a former W.R. Grace vermiculite mine 
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to the asbestos litigation issue in general, it was not peripheral to 
Montana’s senators, and Senator Max Baucus (D-MT) was one 
of the main sponsors of the bill and a key to obtaining support 
from Democrats. 
Second, during the bill’s consideration the press in California 
gave considerable play to the possibility that exposure to 
naturally occurring asbestos there and in other states might cause 
disease.92 This was obviously of great concern to California 
Senator Dianne Feinstein, another key supporter of the bill on 
the Democrats’ side.93
Third, the destruction of the World Trade Center on 
September 11, 2001, and the destruction of many buildings on 
the Gulf Coast by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita released asbestos 
from buildings that, it was feared, might someday cause 
disease.94
and processing center. The vermiculite produced at Libby contained tremolite 
asbestos. Most people who were exposed to tremolite at Libby were exposed 
on the job, but some were exposed in the community. Libby residents assert 
that pleural conditions resulting from their exposure to tremolite are more 
likely to be impairing than exposures to other forms of asbestos. The Libby 
“story” was broken in a series of articles in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer in 
the late 1990s. The authors of those articles subsequently developed and 
updated their views in A. SCHNEIDER & D. MCCUMBER, AN AIR THAT KILLS 
(2004). For more details on Libby and the provisions of the FAIR Act 
relating to Libby, see Elegy, supra note 30, at 525-26. 
92 See, e.g., C. Dahlberg, “Tracing asbestos victims is tough; It’s hard 
to establish levels of health risk posed by naturally occurring minerals in 
developing areas, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 10, 2005, Metro A1, at 1. 
93 At Senator Feinstein’s request, the bill was amended in mark-up 
(through a managers’ amendment) to add § 502, which contained extensive 
regulatory provisions relating to naturally occurring asbestos, as well as § 
121 (g) (10) (allowing people exposed to naturally occurring asbestos to file 
an exceptional medical claim). See S. Rep. 109-97 (2005) at 45, 79. 
94 As a result of concerns about asbestos at the World Trade Center cite 
and in New Orleans, Senator Hillary Clinton (D-NY) and Mary Landrieu (D-
LA) proposed amendments, which were accepted by Senator Specter and 
Senatory Leahy, that would give people who claimed to be injured by 
asbestos from those two disasters the right to file an “exceptional medical 
claim.” S. 3274, § 121 (g) (11). See also Senate Asbestos Bill Expands to 
Include Hurricane, 9/11 Victims, http://safety.com/articles/senate-asbestos-
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The Senate did not feel comfortable excluding even the 
possibility of an award for diseases other than mesothelioma in 
any of these settings, just because exposure was not 
occupational.95 The solution adopted by the Senate Judiciary 
Committee in all of these cases was to underscore the authority 
of Physicians Panels to adjudicate causation through the 
exceptional medical claims procedure. 
The three situations on which the Senate focused, however, 
are just special instances of the general problem of community 
exposure. The FAIR Act arguably should have been read in any 
event to allow claimants to present a case on causation to 
Physicians Panels in any non-occupational exposure case. The 
bill did not, however, provide the panels any clear guidance on 
how such cases should be decided (except in the case of Libby 
exposures, where the bill clearly departed from any sensible 
method for ascertaining causation in order to provide a special 
benefit to that community). The settlement model basically failed 
to provide any guidance for non-occupational exposures, because 
there were very few settlements involving that situation. The 
medical model was of little assistance because the medical issues 
surrounding these kinds of exposure were contested and because 
bill-expands-to-include-hurricane-9/11-victims.html. For the World Trade 
Center, see, e.g., Sewall Chan, Hard To Tell What Causes Fatal Disease to 
Lungs, NY Times, Feb. 13, 2007; Anthony DaPalma, Illness Persisting in 
9/11 Workers, Big Study Finds, NY Times, September 6, 2006 (Health 
Section). For New Orleans, see Sewall Chan & Matthew Wald, Storm & 
Crisis: Overview, Officials Prepare for Partial Return of Residents, NY 
Times, September 17, 2005 (News). 
95  S. 852 contained a number of highly controversial special provisions 
for people exposed to asbestos in Libby, Montana. See Elegy, supra note 30, 
at 526. A key provision was to allow people who ever resided in or near 
Libby to qualify for benefits to be determined by a Physicians Panel without 
regard to occupational exposure. S. 852 § 121 (g) (8). The same approach 
was subsequently applied to naturally occurring asbestos. S. 3274, § 121 (g) 
(10). Several amendments pending on the floor when the bill failed (Nos. 
2834 (Landrieu); 2877 (Clinton)) proposed relaxing the occupational exposure 
requirement further in the case of the World Trade Center attack and natural 
disasters such as Hurricane Katrina. The substance of those amendments 
eventually found their way into S. 3274. See S. 3274, § 121 (g) (11). 
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Congress had no interest in cutting off claims in circumstances 
that attracted a great deal of public attention if there existed even 
a possibility that some claims would be valid. The obvious thing 
to do was to punt the issue to the Physicians Panels. 
Environmental exposure to asbestos is ubiquitous, however, and 
leaving the question of causation to individual determination by 
the Physicians Panels without providing any direction on how 
causation was to be determined created an important uncertainty 
about the operation of the act. 
CONCLUSION 
In the months leading up to the original introduction of the 
FAIR Act in 2003, the asbestos litigation system had so 
deteriorated from the defense point of view that there was an 
unusual propensity to take a chance on a new system. This was 
especially true for defendants, because financial markets were 
largely closing for any company thought to have an “asbestos 
problem.” By that time asbestos litigation had come to involve 
around 8,400 companies, and many were afraid that their 
potential asbestos liabilities might become economically life-
threatening.96 But even insurers, who were somewhat less 
vulnerable, considered asbestos litigation to be out of control 
and were more willing than they had been previously to 
contemplate a legislative option. 
As time passed, however, this appetite for risk declined. 
From the defense perspective, the tort system was significantly 
improving every year. Many courts either formally or informally 
deferred the cases of the unimpaired, and several states enacted 
medical criteria bills. The interstate forum shopping that had 
driven the post-Amchem explosion of asbestos claims abated. 
Large scale consolidations stopped. And as a result of these and 
other factors, including the increasing scandal that began to be 
associated with asbestos litigation, filings plummeted. The 
Manville Trust, for example, which received 93,764 domestic 
cases in 2003, received only 16,607 in 2005—and most of that 
96 RAND REPORT, supra note 5, at 6. 
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decrease was in the non-malignant category.97 Defendants in the 
tort system saw a similar, if less drastic, reduction in filings.98 
More and more companies were sanguine enough about the tort 
system that they no longer felt compelled to endorse a radical 
(and inherently unpredictable) change. At the same time, the 
political process was steadily pushing up the cost of the 
program. The viability of the FAIR Act depended increasingly 
on how many claims, of what kind, would be filed under the 
new system. And the answer to this question depended in large 
part on the adequacy of the bill’s medical eligibility criteria. 
Critical aspects of the medical criteria were surprisingly 
uncontroversial. For example, the criteria separating Level I (the 
unimpaired) from impaired claimants was little discussed, 
although that line has been highly controversial in state medical 
criteria legislation. Similarly, there was not much debate about 
the criteria for non-malignant Levels III through V, which 
covered steadily more impairing cases of asbestos related 
disease. Nor was there any real controversy over the medical 
criteria for mesothelioma. This general area of agreement, 
however, left ample room for dissension. 
Facing intractable medical issues, the sponsors of the bill 
used three primary strategies. First, they referred some medical 
issues to the IOM, which was a trusted, independent source of 
medical expertise. The most important issue of this kind was a 
determination of general asbestos causation for cancers other 
than lung cancer and mesothelioma. More political medical 
issues were, however, too “hot” to be referred to the experts 
and were addressed in other ways. 
Where a neutral medical determination was unattainable, the 
Senate looked toward settlements in the private sector (including 
bankruptcy trusts) as a model for developing standards of its 
own. The settlement model was widely useful and resulted in 
many of the areas of broad agreement. But, it did not provide an 
adequate answer to the problem of lung cancer claims where 
there is no underlying asbestosis. The problem was that there 
97 Hanlon & Smetak, supra note 1, at 594. 
98 Id.. 
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was an insufficient level of confidence that the FAIR Act’s 
administrative system would behave like the tort system—
applying criteria that worked in an adversarial system with high 
transaction costs could have unexpected consequences in a non-
adversarial system with low transaction costs. 
The settlement model similarly failed (but for different 
reasons) in dealing with problems such as non-occupational 
exposure that were very important politically, but had not been 
important in the asbestos litigation. Here the Senate avoided 
resolving the issues by delegating them to a Physician’s Panel, 
but that was probably not a stable solution and would not have 
been accepted in the (then-Republican) House of 
Representatives. The problem was that the financial 
consequences of decisions by Physicians Panels in cases of non-
occupational exposures where there essentially were no exposure 
criteria were too large to tolerate. 
It is hard to know whether the level of risk perceived by the 
defense community in 2006 would have caused it to blanch in 
2003. When the FAIR Act was first introduced, the tort system 
was in such desperate shape that most defendants were prepared 
to take some chances on an untried system. But as the tort 
system improved (partly as a result of the pendency of the bill 
itself, which reduced the incentive of plaintiffs’ lawyers to 
recruit new cases), the burden of proof to be carried by the new 
system steadily grew. One major reason for the failure of the 
bill in 2006 was that the various ways adopted by the Senate to 
resolve medical issues in an environment of extreme distrust on 
scientific issues could not in the end sustain this growing 
burden. Division in the business community, and a reduced level 
of commitment even among businesses that supported the bill, 
eventually created the political space in which the conservative 
opponents, who disliked the bill for both political and 
ideological reasons, could operate. In the end, these 
conservatives, adding their voices to the opposition from that 
part of the Senate that responded to the interests of trial lawyers 
and their allies, brought on in the St. Valentine’s Day Massacre 
of the FAIR Act. 
